Abstract
The Treaty of Lisbon finally entered into force on 1 December 2009, mark ing a fortunate turn for European integ ration from an institutional crisis and effectuating a number of significant changes in the constitutional structure of the EU. Among them the inclusion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) is perhaps 'the largest but still the least discussed' 1 change. In a 300page im pact assessment on the treaty provided by the House of Lords, for instance, this change received only a passing comment.
2 Indeed, when preparing the European Constitution, the predecessor of the Lisbon Treaty, no discussion had been held on the extension of the CCP to investment.
3
As a followup study 4 on the external investment policy of the EU, this article attempts to analyse the relevant provi sions in the Lisbon Treaty and assesses their legal implication on the inter national investment treaty practice of the Union and its Member States. It first briefly reviews the EU's foreign invest ment competence before the Treaty of the Lisbon. Then it assesses the different views concerning the interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty provisions with regard to the inclusion of FDI in the CCP. The practical legal implications of the change are discussed in the third part, including intra and extraEU investment treaty practice. It is concluded that whilst the change is significant and will greatly en hance the treatymaking competence of the EU in the external investment area, it is only half way toward a full common investment policy (CIP). Potential paths to achieve this goal are explored in the end.
The EC's International Investment Competence Before Lisbon: Recent Practices
As has been written before, the EC did not have exclusive, but shared, com petence in international investment matters.
5 This is because the Commu nity had not established either express or implied exclusive competence in this area, as none of the express treaty pro visions or the measures adopted under such provisions covered the entire field of international investment. 6 In Opinion 2/92, for instance, the Court held that the national treatment rule, which was basically a rule on FDI activities, related only partially to international trade with nonmember countries, and therefore Article 113 TEC (on CCP) could not be used as the legal basis for the exclusive Community competence thereon. 7 It also observed that 'although the Community has adopted measures capable of serving as basis for an exclusive external compe tence in accordance with the aforesaid caselaw and falling in particular within the scope of Articles 57(2), 75, 84 and 100a of the EC Treaty, it is undisputed that those measures do not cover all the Ibid.
6
Exclusive competence might also be established on the basis of the nature of the measure to be adopted, as established in Opinion 1/76 [1977 
A The MPoI and Recent Treaty Practice
The Minimum Platform on Investment for EU FTAs 10 was adopted by the Council of the EU on 27 November 2006. As a standardized negotiation proposal for current and future free trade agree ment negotiations with third countries, it intends to satisfy the need of the EC to agree on an investment chapter when a potential FTA is under negotiation.
11 The Platform's scope of application is con fined to 'measures by the Parties affecting establishment'. It is therefore targeted at foreign direct investment, and does not include measures relating to expropri ation and settlement of investor-state disputes.
The MPoI was intended to be the basis on which 'an ambitious investment policy' was to be built. 12 It represented the first formalized and systematic EC approach towards international invest ment treaty making, and was the most significant proof of the EC's recent willing ness to intervene in an external economic policy field so far predominantly left to the Member States. 13 The Platform, however, is unlikely to have a direct impact on the competence division between the Com munity and the Member States, as some have suggested.
14 Legally it is only a ne gotiation template which has not been formally published, not a formal EU regula tion. It therefore does not have the effect of increasing or decreasing the competence of the Union vis-à-vis its Member States. Its symbolic implications may be much more significant than its actual legal impact. Indeed, as the Commission has stressed, any EUnegotiated FTA including BIT like investor protection would require approval by all Member States. 15 Clearly foreign investment remains an area of shared competence between the Union and its Member States. 8 Ibid., at para. 34. 9 For an analysis of the law and practice up to 2000 see Shan, supra note 4. In this connection, it is noted that the EU has already started to negotiate rela tively ambitious investment agreements (or chapters within comprehensive agree ments) in recent years. The EC-Chile As sociation Agreement, for example, grants full national treatment at the pre and postentry stage for both natural and legal persons from the other contracting party, together with consent to stateto state dispute settlement by arbitration.
16
The EU-CARIFORUM EPA signed in 2008 includes a chapter on liberalization of investment based on a positive listing of coverage, protection for current pay ments and capital movements related to FDI, and some provisions on investor be haviour. 17 In February 2009, the EU and Canada published a joint report concern ing the economic and trade relationship, in which investment rules might 'cover pre and postestablishment in all sec tors in order to improve market access and provide for the nondiscriminatory treatment of investors and investments, and to improve transparency.'
18 The EU-MERCOSUR Biregional Agreement is also intended to include obligations on investment. 19 The same is to be seen in the EC's new neighbourhood policy aim ing to create a PanEuroMediterranean market 20 and the current EU-India FTA negotiations, which plan to include an entire chapter on investment. 21 All this treaty practice further confirms the EU's competence in foreign investment mat ters, though such competence is not complete or comprehensive enough for it to sign BITstyle investment treaties on its own.
B Extra-EU BITs and the ECJ Cases
Another important recent development in the Commission's effort to assert in vestment competence is the cases it brought against Sweden, Austria, and Finland before the European Court of Justice (ECJ 31 The ECJ again rejected Finland's assertion that the BIT provisions were not incompatible with Article 307 TEC because they were stated to be subject to the limits authorized by the laws of the contracting parties, of which Commu nity law was a part.
32
The Court consid ered that the scope, interpretation, and effects of those provisions were too un certain, and therefore they were not suffi cient to ensure compatibility with Article 307 TEC. 33 Accordingly, Finland should have renegotiated the treaties to bring them into line with the EC Treaty.
34
The success of the Union in these extraEU BIT cases has confirmed a basic principle of EC law, namely the supremacy of EC law over national law (BITs of Member States can be considered as part of the national legal order). It also demonstrates that the Union does pos sess competence in foreign investment matters, which may not be violated even where such competence has not been exercised by the Union.
To avoid conflicts, some nonEU states took more deliberate steps before the problem arose. 45 The Italy-Czech Re public BIT has already been terminated, while the termination of Denmark-Czech Republic BIT is on the way. 46 Recently Slovenia and Malta announced that they intended to terminate their own BITs.
47
Italy has also evinced the same inten tion. 48 However, some EU Member States do not agree with the Czech Republic's approach. They reportedly include Bel gium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 49 It is noted that many of the recent disputes brought against the Czech Republic arose under BITs with some of those countries.
Recently, the Commission success fully applied to intervene in two invest ment treaty arbitration cases, both re lating to power generation in Hungary. 50 The claims were targeted at Hungarian government requirements that the Hungarian purchasers of electricity make changes to longterm contracts ('power purchase agreements') entered into before Hungarian accession to the EU. Part of the Hungarian defence was that it had to make the changes required under EU law, since the Commission had determined that such agreements were illegal under EU law. 51 In both cases, the Commission was granted permission to file nonparty submissions. 52 While the submissions have not yet been made public, it is generally understood that the Commission intervened to defend Hun gary's actions as being required by EU law. 53 The Commission also reportedly sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the ground that some aspects of the dispute and the underlying con tract from which the dispute arose were subject to EU law, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Commission. to the international investment compe tence of the EU in recent years. While it is not surprising to see that the Commission has been making continuous efforts to assert and expand its foreign investment competence, it appears to be dramatic to find out that the European Courts and the international arbitration tribunals seem to have adopted opposite views with regard to the relationship between EC law and inter national law. In the ECJ cases the decisions were based on EC law, upholding the Com mission's power to intervene into at least some provisions of the BITs which the Member States have entered into. In con trast, the arbitration tribunals ruled that the BITs should be interpreted in accord ance with principles of international law, and thus accession to the EU of one Member State did not implicitly terminate the BITs which that Member State had entered into with other Member States.
54

D Summary and Comments
While the two sets of cases certainly have exposed the tension between the two different legal orders, EU law and international law, a closer look at them demonstrates that they are not as contra dictory as they appear. In the ECJ cases the Court was dealing with essentially a question of EC law, i.e., whether the EU Member States had violated the EC Treaty by refusing to take measures to bring cer tain BITs provisions into conformity with EC law. It was not directly dealing with any question of international law, e.g, whether EC law was superior to inter national law (BITs). It is therefore only natural that it applied EC law principles and arrived at a decision which happened to be favourable to the Commission. In contrast, the investment arbitration tri bunals were dealing with an essentially international law question whether the effective application of the EC Treaty to an EU Member State effectuated the implicit termination of the BITs entered into by the Member State with other Member States. Such a question can be answered only by applying international law principles, ra ther than EC law principles. Even though EC law, particularly the EC Treaty, is rele vant, it is relevant as a matter of legal fact, not as the primary governing law. The same applies to the BIT provisions in the ECJ cases -they were relevant only as matter of fact, not as directly applicable law to the dispute, since the dispute was not a BIT dispute but an EC law dispute.
The two sets of cases can not only be reconciled with each other, but can jointly serve to strengthen the call for a com mon investment policy (CIP). 55 The ECJ cases serve as a positive confirmation of the power the EU already had in foreign investment matters; the arbitration deci sions demonstrate from a negative perspective what kind of troubles and complications the EU and its Member State had to confront without a common invest ment policy at the Union level. It is therefore a great achievement for the Union to include 'foreign direct investment' in its common commercial policy, even though it may not be a ideal solution, as discussed below. Clearly Article 206 TFEU sets out the objectives of the common commercial policy. It follows the former Article 131 TEC but adds 'foreign direct investment' in parallel to 'international trade' as the areas in which the Union intends pro gressively to prohibit restrictions. As dis cussed below, this parallel phrasing has implications in the interpretation of Art icle 207 TFEU, particularly with regard to the question whether the FDI men tioned in Article 207(1) TFEU should be interpreted to cover the entire area of FDI or only 'traderelated aspects' of FDI.
Article 207 TFEU is the body Article of the common commercial policy and deserves close examination. It generally follows the former Article 133 TEC (with some modifications, e.g., in the last para graph), but again adds 'foreign direct investment' to the coverage of the CCP. Paragraph 1 is the most important as it sets out the scope of the policy. While it is clear that FDI is included in the CCP, there is no definition of the term 'foreign direct investment', nor is there any clari fication of the exact scope of FDI under the CCP. It is therefore desirable to dis cuss how the term 'FDI' should be defined and how the entire provision should be interpreted.
B The Meaning of 'Foreign Direct Investment'
The Treaty of Lisbon, however, included FDI under the CCP, but did not define it. 56 In contrast, most BITs, including those signed by EU Member States, contain a definition clause on 'investment', which usually refers to every kind of asset having an economic value, regardless of whether the investor has taken managerial con trol of an undertaking. investments of all kinds by natural per sons or commercial, industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to estab lish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the person providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity. This concept must therefore be understood in its widest sense.
This provides for a Community law defi nition which may be used when defining the same term included in the CCP. Like the IMF and OECD definitions, it stresses a 'lasting and direct link' between the investor and the investment. Although there has been no further clarification on the definition, it is understood that indirect or portfolio investment, such as shortterm loans, contractual claims, and intellectual property rights, is not covered as FDI under the CCP. 60 Accord ingly, while this new competence covers current EU investment activities such as the WTO Doha Round mandate, the EU bilateral agreements, and potentially an EU investment insurance scheme, it only partially covers conventional BITs and other comprehensive bilateral or multilateral investment instruments pro tecting and promoting both direct and in direct foreign investments.
However, this does not mean that the EU is prohibited from concluding com prehensive investment treaties such as BITs. It just has to do so with the partici pation of its Member States, since regu lation of indirect or portfolio investment is still a competence shared with the Member States. The EU's competence on portfolio investment is founded on Article 64 TFEU (ex Article 57 TEC). Indeed, this 57 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) de fines 'direct investment' as reflecting the ob jective of obtaining a lasting interest by an entity resident in one country in an enter prise resident in another economy. The lasting interest implies the existence of a longterm relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of in fluence by the investor on the management of the enterprise: IMF, Balance of Payment Manual (5th edn, 1993), available at: www .imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bopman/bopman .pdf (accessed on 10 Oct. 2010).
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According to the definition of the OECD, foreign direct investment reflects the objective of estab lishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) which is resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the en terprise. See provision has been used, as confirmed by the ECJ, as the legal basis for the EC to participate in the negotiation of compre hensive investment instruments such as OECD National Treatment and the MAI of the OECD, which cover almost every category of foreign investment.
C The Scope of the New FDI Competence: Varied Interpretations
The inclusion of FDI in the CCP has attracted great interest among European and international scholars. As a result, five main interpretations have been given to the scope of the new FDI competence, some narrower, some broader. They are discussed below.
The 'Trade-related Aspects of' Interpretation
This is perhaps the narrowest interpret ation on the CCP coverage of invest ment matter under the Lisbon Treaty. Krajewiki, for example, considers that only those aspects of FDI which are directly linked to international trade agreements would fall within the EU's exclusive com petence, on the basis of the context, ob ject, and purpose as well as negotiating history of the Treaty. 61 He noted that no discussion was held on the extension of CCP to FDI during the deliberations which prepared for the European Con stitution, which suggested that it was not meant to go beyond traderelated aspects of FDI. 62 This interpretation, however, is probably too restrictive. First, although in the immediate context the CCP is termed 'commercial', which traditionally means 'trade' (or indeed 'trade in goods'), its coverage has been significantly expanded to embrace all kinds of economic activities, including the socalled 'trade in services' aspects of intellectual property rights, and for eign investment. A clear demonstration is the attempt by the WTO (a 'trade' or ganization) to negotiate a multilateral agreement on investment.
63 Although the initiative was dropped in the Doha round negotiations, it is not disputed that a proper investment agreement could be included under the umbrella of a 'trade' organization, the WTO. 64 Indeed should the Member States wish to confine it to trade related aspects of FDI, the Lisbon Treaty should have stated this explicitly by using the 'trade related aspects' quali fication, as it did with regard to intellec tual property rights. Secondly, the object and purpose of the CCP under the Lisbon Treaty, as noted above, listed the prohib ition of restriction on both 'international trade' and 'foreign direct investment' in parallel, suggesting that the latter must go beyond the traditional boundary of 61 Krajewiki, supra note 3, at 112-114. 62 Ibid., at 114. 68 It may be that by the time the Constitution was under deliberation a general consensus had been reached on this, and hence no need was felt for further discussion. The nar row interpretation of the inclusion of FDI confining it to only 'traderelated aspects of FDI' must therefore be rejected.
The 'Investment Liberalization' Interpretation
A second interpretation is that the in clusion of FDI brings under the CCP only measures and instruments of 'invest ment liberalization' or 'market access', and does not cover those of 'investment protection'. Leczykiewicz seems to be of this view. Relying on the object of the CCP under Article 206 TFEU, she argued that 'foreign investment is only part of the common commercial policy as far as restrictions on foreign direct investment are concerned, but not where investment protection against expropriation is con cerned'. 69 This interpretation, again, is too narrow to be accepted. There are three main reasons supporting the rejection. First, as UNCTAD research has revealed, the lack of predictability of the host state regulatory environment is among the major factors restricting international investment flows. 70 Nonliberalization measures (such as expropriation and compensation rules), just like liberaliza tion rules, are therefore part and parcel of the entire investment regime which helps to reduce restrictions on FDI. Sec ondly, it is difficult to draw a fine line between foreign investment policies which deal with mark access and those dealing with postaccess conditions. 
The 'Substantially Limited Comprehensive Competence' Interpretation
The third interpretation is provided by Ceyssens who supports a broad reading of the new FDI competence to cover both investment liberalization and regula tion, but excludes two important areas: investment protection against expropri ation and a general standard of fair and equitable treatment. 74 Ceyssens's inter pretation largely relies on Article 207(6) TFEU. 75 Based on the principle of 'paral lelism' alluded to by the ECJ in Opinion 1/94, he argues that 'where the EU does not even have internal competences, there is no need to protect the uniformity of EU rules by conducting a common commercial policy'. 76 And because the abovementioned two policies 'do not exist within the internal market', 77 these two areas should be excluded from the new competence on FDI.
This restrictive interpretation, how ever, also has to be rejected. In the first place, as Wouters, Coppens, and De Meester have pointed out, the principle of parallelism could not be supported by Article 207(6) TFEU because the prin ciple involves the determination of im plicit external competence, not express external competence. 78 Article 207(1) TFEU grants 'an explicit exclusive ex ternal competence, even in the absent of existing internal measures'. 79 Therefore, the scope of the Union's competence on FDI should not be limited to those areas where the Union has already exercised its internal competence. 80 This interpret ation finds support in the fact that the 72 Ibid. See also Opinion 1/78, Nature Rubber Agreement [1979] ECR 2871, at paras 39-49. In this opinion, the ECJ stated: 'A "commercial policy" understood in that sense would be des tined to become nugatory in the course of time. Although it may be thought that at the time when the EC treaty was drafted liberalization of trade was the dominant idea, it nevertheless does not form a barrier to the possibility of the Community's developing a commercial policy aiming at a regulation of the world market for certain products rather than at a mere liberal ization of trade.' 73 Indeed, since FDI is more closely linked to public interest regulations for labour, environmental, and human rights consideration than trade, it makes more sense to treat both investment liber alization and regulation together. See Ceyssens, supra note 60, at 282. 74 Ibid., at 279-281. 75 Art. 207(6) states: 'The exercise of the compe tences conferred by this Article in the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of legislative or regulatory provi sions of the Member States in so far as the Treat ies exclude such harmonisation.' 76 Ceyssens, supra note 60, at 281. 77 
Ibid.
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See Wouters, Coppens, and De Meester, supra note 63, at 173. 79 Ibid.
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Ibid.
at New York University on February 1, 2011 ejil.oxfordjournals.org Downloaded from requirement of unanimity for the adop tion of commercial policy measures in cases where no internal measures have been adopted has not been incorporated in Article 207(4) TFEU, which proves that the lack of internal rules is no im pediment to the adoption of external action, even at a procedural level. In deed, Article 207(6) TFEU is better read as a principle of 'reverse parallelism', since 'parallelism' usually refers to an implicit conferment of external power in areas where internal power has been exercised. Here it is the other way round. The purpose of this provision seems to be to prevent a situation where the exercise of the Union's CCP including FDI com petence affects the fine balance of com petence division between the Union and the Member States within the Union's in ternal order.
Secondly, as noted by Dimopoulos, Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 TEC) has been interpreted narrowly to reserve for the Member States only the power to decide whether and when expropriation occurs, not the conditions under which such expropriation takes place. 81 It can therefore be argued that the EU has the right to determine the conditions of in direct expropriation of foreign invest ment resulting from Union measures, and to harmonize Member States' laws on conditions of expropriation result ing from national measures. 82 Finally, fair and equitable treatment (FET) has already become a rule of international law and is not determined by the laws of the host state. Tribunals have repeatedly emphasized that this treatment standard is independent of the national treatment standard. 83 Notes and comments on the OECD Draft Convention on the Protec tion of Foreign Property of 1967 84 indi cate that the FET treatment standard is set by customary international law. The Free Trade Commission (FTC) of NAFTA also points out that the FET standard in Article 1105(1) reflects the customary international law minimum standard and does not require treatment in add ition to or beyond that which is required by customary international law. 85 As part of customary international law, the FET treatment shall be upheld within and beyond the EU regardless of the division of competence between it and its Member States. The exclusion of the FET standard therefore does not make sense in prac tical terms. For the above considerations, the exception of expropriation and FET from the coverage of the EU's FDI compe tence should be rejected.
The 'Negotiation Competence' Interpretation
A fourth view argued that the inclusion of FDI enables the EU competence only to negotiate and conclude agreements in this area, not to enter into substantive rights and obligations. In other words, the EU has only 'negotiation compe tence', but no 'substantive competence'. (4)) TFEU covers both internal acts such as legislation and external acts including the negotiation and conclusion of treaties. Accordingly, the Article confers on the Union not only procedural rights such as treaty nego tiation, but also substantive rights such as investment regulation. When nego tiating an investment treaty, the Union can not only represent the Union and its Member States as a 'speaker' on their be half, but can also decide on the substan tive terms of the treaties as far they fall within the Union's competence. Other wise the inclusion of FDI would do little, if anything, to enhance the efficiency of the EU, which is one of the major purposes of the Lisbon Treaty.
The 'Comprehensive FDI Competence' Interpretation
Some commentators have argued for a comprehensive EU competence in FDI, enabling the Union to enter into international obligation similar to those included in the US freetrade agree ments. 88 Dimopoulos, for example, is of the view that the new EU FDI compe tence should cover admission, capital movement (transfer), postadmission treatment including FET treatment, per formance requirements and free move ment of key personnel, expropriation, and investor-state dispute settlement. 89 This effectively covers all major aspects covered by a typical BIT.
Given that the term 'foreign direct in vestment' was not unqualified under the CCP, and taking into account the need for the Union to be able to act effectively in the entire area of international invest ment lawmaking, this broad interpret ation should be preferred. This, however, does not mean that the Union could, on its own, enter into investment treaties in exactly the same way as ordinary BITs.
One must note that the Union's ex clusive competence on investment has been confined to 'foreign direct invest ment', while BITs typically cover both direct and indirect investment. The lat ter, which is also termed 'portfolio in vestment', lies beyond the exclusive competence of the Union. Indirect (as well as direct) investment may, argu ably, be covered by Article 64 TFEU (ex Article 57 TEC) concerning free move ment of capital. However, as noted by the ECJ, it does not confer express exclu sive competence on the EU, nor does it provide sufficient legal basis for an im plicit exclusive competence of the EU in this area. 90 It therefore follows that to sign a BIT in its conventional sense the Union would have to act jointly with the Member States. It might nevertheless be possible for the Union to choose to sign a BIT to cover only FDI, leaving portfolio investment aside. This however does not seems to be a very appealing choice, given the increasing importance of portfolio investment, particularly in an economy as developed as that of the EU. It is therefore more likely that the Union will have to team up with its Member States to enter into comprehensive in vestment treaties anyway. The Union has gone a long way toward achieving this competence on FDI, yet it is still only half way toward a full 'common invest ment competence'.
D Summary: Half Way toward a Common Investment Policy of the EU
The inclusion of FDI in the CCP has con ferred on the EU exclusive competence on FDI. This competence should be inter preted as a comprehensive competence on all FDI matters, rather than being restrictively interpreted to cover only traderelated aspects of FDI, or matters relating to investment liberalization, or the negotiation of FDI agreements, or an FDI competence excluding essential com ponents such as expropriation and fair and equitable treatment. Such a compre hensive competence, however, does not cover foreign indirect or portfolio invest ments, which remain a shared compe tence between the Union and its Member States. The new competence is therefore only half way toward a complete 'com mon investment policy'. The legal impli cations of the new competence on the BIT practices within the EU are further explored below.
The EC's International Investment Competence after Lisbon: The Legal Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs
As noted above, there were notable prac tices relating to both BITs between EU Member States (intraEU BITs) and BITs between EU Member States and third states (extraEU BITs) in the years pre ceding the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Whether and to what extent the new FDI competence under the CCP may change the legal landscapes in the two areas merits further discussion.
A Intra-EU BITs after Lisbon
Bilateral investment treaties between Member States of the EU have long been all but nonexistent. 91 Before the 2004 enlargement, there were only two intra EU BITs. 92 However, the number dramat ically increased to about 150 after the accession of 10 new Member States in 2004. 93 Most of these BITs were signed in the 1990s when the Eastern European countries began to transform into market economies. In 2007, the total number reached 191 following the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania. Apart from Ire land and Portugal, all the old EU Member These two BITs were signed separately by Germany with Greece and Portugal. Actually, both of them were concluded before Greece and Portugal became Member States of the EC in 1981 and 1986 respectively.
States had entered into BITs with all these new EU Member States, and most of these BITs have already entered into force. 94 The dramatic increase of the intraEU BITs has elevated the conflict between intraEU BITs and EU law from fiction to reality. As noted above, the Commis sion was of the view that the intraEU BITs were no longer needed and hence implicitly terminated after the accession of the Eastern European States to the EU, a suggestion which was rejected by the Member States. Whether the EU's new FDI competence under the CCP could change the answer given by the tribunal in the Eastern Sugar case, in other words, whether the intra EU BITs would become automatically and implicitly terminated or suspended after Lisbon, is a new question which needs to be answered here. As pointed out by the Eastern Sugar tribunal, this question must be assessed in accordance with general principles of international law as expressed in the Vienna Conven tion on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), par ticularly Article 59. 99 The Article reads:
Article 59 Termination or suspension of the oper ation of a treaty implied by conclusion of a later treaty 1. A treaty shall be considered as termi nated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to the same subject-matter and: a. It appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that the par ties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty; or b. The provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the same time. 2. The earlier treaty shall be considered as only suspended in operation if it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that such was the intention of the parties [em phasis added].
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Ireland has only one BIT with the Czech Repub lic and Portugal does not have one with Estonia. As of July 2009, all these intraEU BITs had entered into force except the Cyprus-Italy BIT, which was signed on 27 April 2004: see Wehland, supra note 90, at 298.
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Supra note 42, at paras 95-181. 96 See VisDunbar, supra note 43. There appears to be no public information available with re gard to the progress of the court proceedings in Prague, so it can only be inferred from the rela tive report. It appears that the VCLT applies three tests for this issue. First, as a precon dition, the two treaties must cover the 'same subject matter'; secondly, a com mon 'intention' of termination can be established; or, thirdly, the two treaties are clearly 'incompatible'. The Eastern Sugar tribunal looked at and answered in the negative all the three tests. Below is a discussion of any changes which may have resulted from the inclusion of FDI in the CCP by the Lisbon Treaty by using the three tests. First, a precondition for the implicit termination of a treaty (e.g., an intraEU BIT) by the conclusion of a later treaty (the EC Treaty) is that both the earlier and later treaties cover the 'same sub ject matter'. The Eastern Sugar tribunal examined this issue and concluded in the negative on the basis that the applicable BIT and EC law (Article 57 TEC (Article 64 TFEU)) did not cover the 'same precise subjectmatter' even though both dealt with intraEC investment. 100 Most im portantly, the tribunal noted that EC law did not provide the investor-state dispute resolution mechanism found in BITs, which it considered 'the best guarantee that the investment will be protected against potential undue infringements by the host state'. 101 As argued above, the new EU competence on FDI is com prehensively capable of offering guar antees provided by BITs including the investor-state dispute resolution mech anism. It is therefore tempting to argue that after Lisbon the EU Treaty now cov ers or is able to cover the same subject matter as that under traditional intraEU BITs. However, since the EU's exclusive FDI competence does not cover indirect investment, BIT protection over indirect investments remains out of the exclusive competence of the EU. It is therefore dif ficult to argue that EU law and BITs are now covering the 'same precise subject matter'. Accordingly it remains difficult to argue that intraEU BITs should be superseded by the new EU competence on FDI.
Secondly, the EU Member States re main divided in their approach to this question. In the Eastern Sugar case, the tribunal held that a common intention of the Czech Republic and the Netherlands to terminate the BIT or to supersede it by EC law could not be established.
102 This is still the case today, as noted above. 103 Although FDI has been included in the CCP, EU Member States are yet to reach a consensus (or a common intention) to terminate existing intraEU BITs and to replace them with Community law. This certainly does not help in establishing a case for the explicit termination of exist ing intraEU BITs.
Thirdly, it is important to examine whether the two treaties are 'incompat ible'. In Eastern Sugar, the tribunal found that the BIT and the EC Treaty are not incompatible, because free movement of capital and protection of investment are 'different but complementary things'. 
Existing Extra-EU BITs
A short answer to the question of the im pact of the EU's FDI competence on exist ing extraEU BITs is that they will not be required to be terminated or superseded under either international or EU law. However, they may have to be modified in accordance with the requirements of EU law, as confirmed by the recent ECJ cases mentioned above.
The legal basis for the continued val idity of extraEU BITs can be found in general international law as expressed in Article 30(4) of the VCLT, 106 which essentially establishes that 'a treaty be tween two parties will not be superseded by a subsequent treaty that one of the parties enters into with a third party'. However, while it is clear that the EU now has exclusive competence on FDI treatymaking, it is unclear how this new competence may be exercised, particu larly when it comes to the question of investment dispute resolution. Most im portant questions include: whether the EU as a regional community could ne gotiate investor-state dispute resolution provisions? In the event of a dispute which one, the Union or any Member State, will be the respondent?
With regard to the first question, some have argued that the EU could not nego tiate an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism clause because it is not a 'state', whereas only a state can partici pate in the ICSID Convention.
114 How ever, this does not appear to be a real problem. The EU may, for instance, agree with the other contracting party that the foreign investor can submit a dispute to ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules. Alternatively, the EU can also seek revision of the ICSID Convention to allow it to become a party.
The question about the respondent party in a dispute brought by an investor under an EU BIT appears more complex. In this regard, the practice of the EU with the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) may be helpful. Both the European Communities and the Member States are members of the ECT. In order to solve the respondent problem, the Communities submitted a Statement to the Secretariat of the En ergy Charter in 1998 which included the following:
The Communities and the Member States will, if necessary, determine among them who is the respondent party to arbitra tion proceedings initiated by an Investor of another Contracting Party. In such case, upon the request of the Investor, the Communities and the Member States concerned will make such determination within a period of 30 days.
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In the current negotiation of the FTA between the EU and Canada, the text concerning the investment proposed by Canada has proved to consist essentially of its Model BIT language for investor and investment protection, including inves tortostate arbitration. 116 It is therefore interesting to see how such provisions will finally turn out. What can be ascertained 113 Ibid. 114 See, e.g., Bungenberg, supra note 1, at 149. 
C Summary
The new FDI competence of the EU does not legally require the automatic and implicit termination of existing intraEU BITs, be cause the new competence does not cover exactly the same subject matter as existing intraEU BITs; because a consensus is yet to be established among EU Member States on this; and because the incompatibility of the existing intraEU BITs with the new competence is yet to be established. In a similar vein, the new FDI com petence of the EU does not require the termination of existing extraEU BITs either, in accordance with both national and Community law. However, after Lisbon, EU Member States have lost their power to conclude (both intra and extraEU) BITs protecting FDI, given that that now falls within the exclusive competence of the EU. Member States nevertheless still have an essential role to play when the EU intends to con clude conventional BITs covering both direct and indirect foreign investments. It is possible for the EU to enter into BITs including investor-state dispute reso lution provisions. The EU's experience with the ECT offers a good example of how the respondent issue may be solved.
Conclusion: Towards a Complete Common Investment Policy of the EU
The Lisbon Treaty has achieved only half a success for a common investment policy (CIP). Foreign direct investment (FDI) is now covered by the CCP, enab ling the EU to take a uniform policy on FDI in the international arena. How ever, foreign indirect investment is still outside the reach of the EU's exclusive competence. The EU therefore has to seek cooperation from its Member States when entering into conventional BITs covering both direct and indirect invest ment. This is a significant step forward, but is not an ideal solution. As mentioned above, the EU is more likely to enter into comprehensive investment treaties (bi lateral or multilateral) covering both direct and indirect investments, which means that the EU has to seek cooper ation from its Member States when concluding most investment treaties. This situation needs to change. As argued elsewhere, a common invest ment policy is essential for the EU to deal with an increasingly competitive world. First, a complete CIP would improve the policy coherence, thus reducing asymmetries and uncertainties with the different policies existing in the EU becoming integrated and transparent. A transparent investment environment is crucial to attracting foreign inves tors from third countries, and vice versa. And this will eventually strengthen EU trade policy as trade and investment are strong linked. Secondly, it would increase the attractiveness of the EU as an investment destination, because a harmonized investment scheme on an EU level would create a fair level play ing field for foreign investors. Thirdly, it would enhance the bargaining power of the EU, as the negotiating power of the EU together would be much stronger than those of individual EU Member States. 117 A CIP of the EU will benefit not only the EU, but also the rest of the world. On the one hand, with a CIP the EU is bet ter positioned to push forward a global investment treaty. A multilateral invest ment treaty is not a new topic. This pro posal has been tried and failed in both the OECD and the WTO, of both of which the EU and its Member States are the main supporters. It should be pointed out that a multilateral investment treaty is still needed despite these failures and the 'new regionalism'. The fragmentation and 'le gitimacy crisis' of bilateral and regional investment treaties have put the 'spa ghetti bowl' of investment treaties under severe criticism. In the current economic downturn, investment protectionism has gained the upper hand in some quarters of the world. As a response, there are renewed calls for a global investment re gime. The OECD, for example, recently announced that it was considering the feasability of a nonbinding 'Model In vestment Treaty' to avoid an escalation of investment restrictions. 118 A complete CIP of the EU would certainly help in fa cilitating the negotiation process avoid ing the MAI debacle happening again. In this respect, the great success of the OECD Model Tax Convention, which serves as the basis for the more than 3,000 bilateral tax treaties in force today in the world, may provide positive experi ence.
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A complete CIP of the EU might help in the development of a more balanced investment treaty regime. 120 Article 21 TFEU states that the Union's action shall be guided by the principles of 'democ racy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fun damental freedoms, respect of human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and inter national law'. Article 205 TFEU, under the title of 'Common Commercial Policy', clearly refers to Article 21 TEU, point ing out that the Union's action 'shall be guided by the principles, pursue the objectives and be conducted in accord ance with the general provisions laid down' in Article 21 TEU. This makes it clear that the Union does have not only a liberalization agenda, but also the other objectives -human rights, good governance, environmental protection, sustainable development -in the ne gotiation of investment agreements. It is reported that, for example, the EU in 2007 proposed a clause on human rights in the trade negotiations between the EU and India. 121 In April 2008 -before the second Irish plebiscite -the Parliament declared in a resolution that it would give its consent to the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement between the EC and the Gulf Cooperation Council only if those objec tives laid down in Article 21 TEU were suf ficiently taken into account. 122 It is hoped that the EU's emphasis on social responsi bilities will eventually help to build a more balanced global investment regime.
To achieve a complete CIP, two approaches could be used. On the one hand, it might be achieved by implication through the operation of 'parallelism' principle. In other words, the EU could adopt measures and acts to harmonize foreign investment policies within the 121 EU aiming at establishing a uniform Union foreign investment policy. Then through the operation of the parallelism principle, the EU would acquire exclu sive competence in the area. This possi bility has been confirmed by the ECJ in, for example, Opinion 2/92. 123 However, it might take a series of measures and a long time to achieve the desired effect. The preferred route obviously is to confer the EU express exclusive competence in the entire area of foreign investment in cluding both direct and indirect invest ments by, for example, revising the CCP provision under the TFEU replacing the current FDI with 'foreign investment'. Until this is done, the EU international investment treaty operations will remain seriously constrained.
